

Calendar No. 588

111TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION**S. RES. 573**

Urging the development of a comprehensive strategy to ensure stability in
Somalia, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 29, 2010

Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself, Ms. KLOBUCHAR, Mr. FRANKEN, and Mr.
CARDIN) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the
Committee on Foreign Relations

SEPTEMBER 24, 2010

Reported by Mr. KERRY, with an amendment and an amendment to the
preamble

[Strike out all after the resolving clause and insert the part printed in *italic*]

[Strike the preamble and insert the part printed in *italic*]

RESOLUTION

Urging the development of a comprehensive strategy to
ensure stability in Somalia, and for other purposes.

~~Whereas Somalia has been without a functioning central gov-~~
~~ernment since 1991, resulting in lawlessness and an in-~~
~~creasingly desperate humanitarian situation;~~

~~Whereas, despite the return of the internationally recognized~~
~~Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to Mogadishu~~
~~and ongoing diplomatic efforts through the Djibouti~~

Peace Process, supported by the United Nations, there has been little improvement in the governance or stability of southern and central Somalia, and armed opposition groups continue to exploit this situation;

Whereas the traditional mediation role played by Somali elders has been eroded as the dynamics of conflict and the proliferation of weapons make it difficult to influence warring parties;

Whereas, since 2007, armed violence has resulted in the deaths of at least 21,000 people in Somalia and the displacement of nearly 2,000,000 people, including over 500,000 refugees in Kenya, Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Tanzania, and Uganda;

Whereas the United Nations estimates that 3,200,000 people, or 43 percent of the population of Somalia, are in need of humanitarian assistance and livelihood support to survive;

Whereas the United Nations reports that almost 1,000,000 displaced Somalis in need of aid cannot be reached by United Nations refugee and food agencies because of growing insecurity and the threat of kidnappings to staff;

Whereas local humanitarian organizations are trying to meet the needs of the Somali people by restoring basic social services in urban and rural communities, which places them on the front lines of the conflict and make them vulnerable targets for killings, kidnappings, or being accused of working for foreign governments;

Whereas al Shabaab, which has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the Department of State, and other armed groups continue to wage war against the

Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu and one another to gain control over territory in Somalia;

Whereas al Shabaab has claimed responsibility for many bombings—including suicide attacks—in Mogadishu, as well as in central and northern Somalia, typically targeting officials of the Government of Somalia and perceived allies of the TFG;

Whereas, according to Human Rights Watch, al Shabaab is subjecting inhabitants of areas under its control in southern Somalia to executions, cruel punishments, including amputations and floggings, and repressive social control;

Whereas the human rights situation in Somalia has dramatically worsened over the past several years with increased numbers of killings, torture, kidnappings, and rape;

Whereas the 2009 Department of State Country Terrorism Report notes that “Somalia’s fragile transitional Federal government, protracted state of violent instability, its long, unguarded coastline, porous borders, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, made the country an attractive location for international terrorists seeking a transit or launching point for operations in Somalia or elsewhere”;

Whereas the situation in southern and central Somalia, particularly the activity of al Shabaab, poses direct threats to the stability of Puntland and Somaliland regions, as well as the stability of neighboring states and the wider region;

Whereas al Shabaab leaders have stated their intent to provide recruits and support for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen;

Whereas the Government of Eritrea has provided military and financial support for armed opposition groups, in-

cluding al Shabaab, in part as a proxy front in its continuing tensions with Ethiopia;

Whereas, according to the most recent report by the United Nations Somalia Monitoring Group, arms, ammunitions, and military or dual-use equipment continue to enter Somalia at a fairly steady rate, primarily from Yemen and Ethiopia;

Whereas, in July 2009, the Department of State confirmed that, in addition to other support for the TFG, it had provided cash to purchase weapons and ammunitions for the TFG's efforts "to repel the onslaught of extremist forces which are intent on destroying the Djibouti peace process";

Whereas, according to most recent report by the United Nations Somalia Monitoring Group, "[d]espite infusions of foreign training and assistance, government security forces remain ineffective, disorganized and corrupt—a composite of independent militias loyal to senior government officials and military officers who profit from the business of war and resist their integration under a single command";

Whereas, on April 24, 2010, President Barack Obama issued an executive order to sanction or freeze the assets of militants who threaten, both directly and indirectly, the stability of Somalia, as well as individuals involved in piracy off Somalia's coast;

Whereas, in March 2009, at a hearing of the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs of the Senate, Andrew Liepman, Deputy Director of Intelligence at the National Counterterrorism Center, noted that "[s]ince 2006, a number of U.S. citizens [have] traveled

to Somalia, possibly to train in extremist training camps”;

Whereas, in September 2009, at a hearing of the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs of the Senate, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Michael Leiter testified that “the potential for al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia to commission Americans to return to the United States and launch attacks against the Homeland remains of significant concern”; and

Whereas the extraordinary and ongoing crisis in Somalia has enormous humanitarian consequences and direct national security implications for the United States and our allies in the region: Now, therefore, be it

Whereas Somalia has been without a functioning central government since 1991, resulting in lawlessness and an increasingly desperate humanitarian situation;

Whereas, despite the return of the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to Mogadishu and ongoing diplomatic efforts through the Djibouti Peace Process, supported by the United Nations, there has been little improvement in the governance or stability of southern and central Somalia, and armed opposition groups continue to exploit this situation;

Whereas the traditional mediation role played by Somali elders has been eroded as the dynamics of conflict and the proliferation of weapons make it difficult to influence warring parties;

Whereas, since 2007, armed violence has resulted in the deaths of at least 21,000 people in Somalia and the displacement of nearly 2,000,000 people, including over 500,000 refugees

in Kenya, Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Tanzania, and Uganda;

Whereas the United Nations estimates that 3,200,000 people, or 43 percent of the population of Somalia, are in need of humanitarian assistance and livelihood support to survive;

Whereas the United Nations reports that almost 1,000,000 displaced Somalis in need of aid cannot be reached by United Nations refugee and food agencies because of growing insecurity and the threat of kidnappings to staff;

Whereas local humanitarian organizations are trying to meet the needs of the Somali people by restoring basic social services in urban and rural communities, which places them on the front lines of the conflict and make them vulnerable targets for killings, kidnappings, or being accused of working for foreign governments;

Whereas al Shabaab, which has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the Department of State, and other armed groups continue to wage war against the Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu and one another to gain control over territory in Somalia;

Whereas al Shabaab has claimed responsibility for many bombings—including suicide attacks—in Mogadishu, as well as in central and northern Somalia, typically targeting officials of the Government of Somalia and perceived allies of the TFG;

Whereas, according to Human Rights Watch, al Shabaab is subjecting inhabitants of areas under its control in southern Somalia to executions, cruel punishments, including amputations and floggings, and repressive social control;

Whereas the human rights situation in Somalia has dramatically worsened over the past several years with increased numbers of killings, torture, kidnappings, and rape;

Whereas the 2009 Department of State Country Terrorism Report notes that “Somalia’s fragile transitional Federal government, protracted state of violent instability, its long, ungarded coastline, porous borders, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, made the country an attractive location for international terrorists seeking a transit or launching point for operations in Somalia or elsewhere”;

Whereas the situation in southern and central Somalia, particularly the activity of al Shabaab, poses direct threats to the stability of Puntland and Somaliland regions, as well as the stability of neighboring states and the wider region;

Whereas al Shabaab leaders have stated their intent to provide recruits and support for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen;

Whereas the Government of Eritrea has provided military and financial support for armed opposition groups, including al Shebaab, in part as a proxy front in its continuing tensions with Ethiopia;

Whereas, according to the most recent report by the United Nations Somalia Monitoring Group, arms, ammunitions, and military or dual-use equipment continue to enter Somalia at a fairly steady rate, in violation of the general and complete arms embargo imposed in 1992;

Whereas, in July 2009, the Department of State confirmed that, in addition to other support for the TFG, it had provided cash to purchase weapons and ammunitions for the TFG’s efforts “to repel the onslaught of extremist forces which are intent on destroying the Djibouti peace process”;

Whereas, according to most recent report by the United Nations Somalia Monitoring Group, “[d]espite infusions of foreign training and assistance, government security forces remain ineffective, disorganized and corrupt — a composite of independent militias loyal to senior government officials and military officers who profit from the business of war and resist their integration under a single command”;

Whereas, on April 13, 2010, President Barack Obama issued an executive order to sanction or freeze the assets of militants who threaten, both directly and indirectly, the stability of Somalia, as well as individuals involved in piracy off Somalia’s coast;

Whereas, in March 2009, at a hearing of the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs of the Senate, Andrew Liepman, Deputy Director of Intelligence at the National Counterterrorism Center, noted that “[s]ince 2006, a number of U.S. citizens [have] traveled to Somalia, possibly to train in extremist training camps”;

Whereas, in September 2009, at a hearing of the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs of the Senate, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Michael Leiter testified that “the potential for al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia to commission Americans to return to the United States and launch attacks against the Homeland remains of significant concern”;

Whereas al Shabaab has claimed responsibility for the bombings in Kampala, Uganda on July 11, 2010, which killed 76 people, including one American, and wounded scores of other people; and

Whereas the extraordinary and ongoing crisis in Somalia has enormous humanitarian consequences and direct national security implications for the United States and our allies in the region: Now therefore be it

1 *Resolved, That the Senate—*

2 (1) acknowledges the urgency of addressing the
3 threats to United States national security in Somalia
4 and the conditions that foster those threats;

5 (2) reaffirms its commitment to stand with all
6 the people of Somalia who aspire to a future free of
7 terrorism and violence through advancing political
8 reconciliation and building legitimate and inclusive
9 governance institutions;

10 (3) recognizes the difficult, but very important,
11 work being done by the African Union Mission in
12 Somalia (AMISOM) to help secure parts of
13 Mogadishu, and reaffirms its support for the mis-
14 sion;

15 (4) calls on the Transitional Federal Govern-
16 ment in Somalia—

17 (A) to cease immediately any use of child
18 soldiers;

19 (B) to ensure better accountability and
20 transparency for all received security assistance;

21 (C) to renew its commitment to political
22 reconciliation; and

1 (D) to take necessary steps toward becoming
2 a more legitimate and inclusive government
3 in the eyes of the people of Somalia;

4 (5) calls on all actors and governments in the
5 region, particularly the Government of Eritrea, to
6 play a productive role in helping to bring about
7 peace and stability to Somalia, including ceasing to
8 provide any financial or material support to armed
9 opposition groups in Somalia;

10 (6) welcomes efforts by the President to bring
11 greater focus and resources toward understanding
12 and monitoring the situation in Somalia;

13 (7) urges the President to develop a comprehensive
14 strategy to ensure that all United States humanitarian,
15 diplomatic, political, and counterterrorism programs in Somalia and the wider Horn of
16 Africa are coordinated and making progress toward
17 the long-term goal of establishing stability, respect
18 for human rights, and functional, inclusive governance in Somalia;

21 (8) urges the President and Secretary of State,
22 as part of a comprehensive strategy—

23 (A) to provide greater support for a range
24 of diplomatic initiatives to engage clan leaders,
25 business leaders, and civil society leaders in So-

1 malia and the Somali Diaspora in political rec-
2 onciliation and consensus-building;

3 (B) to ensure better oversight, monitoring,
4 and transparency of all United States security
5 assistance provided to the TFG;

6 (C) to increase and strengthen the United
7 States diplomatic team working on Somalia, in-
8 cluding the appointment of a senior envoy, and
9 to ensure that these officials have the necessary
10 resources, access, and mandate;

11 (D) to pursue opportunities for periodic,
12 temporary United States Government travel to
13 Somalia, consistent with any security concerns;

14 (E) to expand and deepen our engagement
15 with the regions of Somaliland and Puntland
16 and other regional administrations in order to
17 promote good governance, effective law enforce-
18 ment, respect for human rights, and stability in
19 these regions;

20 (F) to explore, in consultation with the
21 Secretary of the Treasury, increased options for
22 pressuring individuals, governments, and other
23 actors who undertake economic activities that
24 support armed opposition groups and violence
25 in Somalia; and

1 (G) to develop, in consultation with the
 2 Administrator of the United States Agency for
 3 International Development, creative and flexible
 4 mechanisms for delivering basic humanitarian
 5 assistance to the people of Somalia while mini-
 6 mizing the risk of significant diversion to armed
 7 opposition groups.

8 *That the Senate—*

9 (1) *acknowledges the urgency of addressing the*
 10 *threats to United States national security in Somalia*
 11 *and the conditions that foster those threats;*

12 (2) *reaffirms its commitment to stand with all*
 13 *the people of Somalia who aspire to a future free of*
 14 *terrorism and violence through advancing political*
 15 *reconciliation and building legitimate and inclusive*
 16 *governance institutions;*

17 (3) *recognizes the difficult, but very important,*
 18 *work being done by the African Union Mission in So-*
 19 *malia (AMISOM) to help secure parts of Mogadishu,*
 20 *and reaffirms its support for the mission;*

21 (4) *calls on the Transitional Federal Government*
 22 *in Somalia—*

23 (A) *to cease immediately any use of child*
 24 *soldiers;*

1 (B) to ensure better accountability and
2 transparency for all received security assistance;

3 (C) to renew its commitment to political
4 reconciliation; and

5 (D) to take necessary steps toward becoming
6 a more legitimate and inclusive government in
7 the eyes of the people of Somalia;

8 (5) calls on all actors and governments in the re-
9 gion, particularly the Government of Eritrea, to play
10 a productive role in helping to bring about peace and
11 stability to Somalia, including ceasing to provide any
12 financial or material support to al Shabaab and
13 other armed opposition groups in Somalia;

14 (6) welcomes efforts by the President to bring
15 greater focus and resources toward understanding and
16 monitoring the situation in Somalia;

17 (7) urges the President to develop a comprehen-
18 sive strategy to ensure that all United States humani-
19 tarian, diplomatic, political, and counterterrorism
20 programs in Somalia and the wider Horn of Africa
21 are coordinated and making progress toward the long-
22 term goal of establishing stability, respect for human
23 rights, and functional, inclusive governance in Soma-
24 lia;

1 (8) *urges the President and Secretary of State,*
2 *as part of a comprehensive strategy—*

3 (A) *to provide greater support for a range*
4 *of diplomatic initiatives to engage clan leaders,*
5 *business leaders, and civil society leaders in So-*
6 *malia and the Somali Diaspora in political rec-*
7 *onciliation and consensus-building;*

8 (B) *to ensure better oversight, monitoring,*
9 *and transparency of all United States security*
10 *assistance provided to the TFG;*

11 (C) *to increase and strengthen the United*
12 *States diplomatic team working on Somalia, in-*
13 *cluding the appointment of a senior envoy, and*
14 *to ensure that these officials have the necessary*
15 *resources, access, and mandate;*

16 (D) *to pursue opportunities for periodic,*
17 *temporary United States Government travel to*
18 *Somalia, consistent with any security concerns;*

19 (E) *to expand and deepen our engagement*
20 *with the regional administration of Puntland*
21 *and other regional administrations in order to*
22 *promote good governance, effective law enforce-*
23 *ment, respect for human rights, and stability in*
24 *these regions;*

1 (F) to provide additional humanitarian, de-
 2 velopment, and security assistance to the region
 3 of Somaliland, recognizing the positive develop-
 4 ments in that region with respect to consoli-
 5 dating multi-party democracy, which was evi-
 6 dent in the recent election there;

7 (G) to outline punitive measures and incen-
 8 tives that can be used with the Government of
 9 Eritrea to bring a halt to its financial and ma-
 10 terial support for armed opposition groups in
 11 Somalia, including steps to improve bilateral re-
 12 lations and to push for a resolution of Eritrea's
 13 border dispute with Ethiopia consistent with the
 14 arbitration decision of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Bor-
 15 der Commission;

16 (H) to explore, in consultation with the Sec-
 17 retary of the Treasury, increased options for
 18 pressuring individuals, governments, and other
 19 actors who undertake economic activities that
 20 support al Shabaab and other armed opposition
 21 groups in Somalia; and

22 (I) to develop, in consultation with the Ad-
 23 ministrator of the United States Agency for
 24 International Development, creative and flexible
 25 mechanisms for delivering basic humanitarian

- 1 *and development assistance to the people of So-*
- 2 *malia while minimizing the risk of significant*
- 3 *diversion to armed opposition groups.*

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2^D Session

S. RES. 573

RESOLUTION

Urging the development of a comprehensive strategy to ensure stability in Somalia, and for other purposes.

SEPTEMBER 24, 2010

Reported with an amendment and an amendment to the
preamble